Palestinians Today and the Jews of That Time

By: Mohammad Reza Shalgooni

Translated by: Ali Abani, Bijhan V

The suffering that the Palestinians are going through today strikingly resembles the plight of Jewish people caught in the bloody clutches of Hitler’s Germany. Today, Gaza is closest in resemblance to the Warsaw Ghetto of 1943. Imprisoned Jewish people in the Warsaw Ghetto made up about 38% of Warsaw’s population in 1940. They were confined to an area less than 4.5% of the city’s size. In November of the same year, the Nazis built a wall around the ghetto, stationed armed guards to control the zone, and began forcing Polish Jewish people into it.

Inside the ghetto, unemployment, illness, and hunger were so severe that in two years, about a quarter of the population died. Starting in late 1942, the residents of the Warsaw Ghetto were transported to the Treblinka death camp. Until then, most of the Jewish people had not mounted significant resistance. Upon discovering the convoy’s destination and the Nazis’ plans for extermination, they began to resist. In early 1943, resistance efforts began to grow. The Nazis halted the deportations briefly, but the Jewish people had already uncovered their genocidal plan. Refusing to submit, they initiated the heroic uprising on April 19, 1943, the night of Jewish Passover (1). The Jewish youth fought courageously against the German army. The Nazis crushed the uprising by burning the ghetto house by house and massacring its inhabitants.

Drawing this undeniable parallel between the Warsaw Ghetto and Gaza today is considered antisemitic by Israel’s defenders and its extensive propaganda apparatus (2). However, the historical similarities between the two situations are profound. In recent months, this comparison has gained significant attention and cannot be ignored. Richard Falk, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Council on the Status of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and a prominent law professor at Princeton University in the United States, described the situation in Gaza as a “repeating Holocaust” long before the 22-day massacre in June 2007. Falk, who is himself Jewish, faced backlash from the Israeli government for his remarks. In April 2008, Israel denied him a visa to revisit the occupied territories.

Gaza Before the Recent Raids

To grasp the scale of the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, it is crucial to understand its geography. Gaza, part of the occupied Palestinian territories, lies in southwest Israel, bordered by Israel to the north and east, the Mediterranean Sea to the west, and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula to the south. The Gaza Strip is approximately 41 km long and 6 to 12 km wide, covering a total area of about 360 square kilometers. It is home to about 1.5 million Palestinians, making its population density among the highest in the world. For context, Manhattan in New York City has a population density of 25,000 people per square kilometer, while Gaza’s Jabaliya refugee camp in northern Gaza has over 74,000 people per square kilometer.

Much of Gaza’s land is uninhabitable due to sand dunes, and only 13% of its area is arable. Urban centers like Gaza City, Rafah, Khan Yunus, Beit Lahia, and Jabaliya house more than half the population. With a high population growth rate of 3–5% per year and fertility rates of 5.5–6 children per woman, over 80% of Gaza’s population is under fifty, and more than 50% are children under 15. Additionally, more than 70% of refugees in Gaza are children, descendants of Palestinians forcibly displaced from 530 towns and villages by Israeli paramilitary groups like Haganah, Irgun, and Stern in 1948.

In 2006, the World Food Program classified 42% of Gaza’s population as facing “catastrophic levels of hunger” (3). In five districts, this figure exceeded 50%. Another 30% of Gazans were classified as vulnerable to malnutrition. Despite the worsening economic conditions in all occupied territories since the Oslo Accords, poverty in Gaza has accelerated dramatically. A 2006 UN report found that poverty had risen from less than 30% in 2000 to 79% in 2006.

Before the Israeli military operation in October 2023, much of Gaza’s infrastructure remained unrepaired from previous assaults. Residents endured chronic power outages, limited access to clean water, and inadequate sewage systems. Close to half the workforce was unemployed, and two-thirds lived in poverty (4). Harvard economist Sara Roy noted that poverty in Gaza had reached levels comparable to Sub-Saharan Africa. In a study conducted two years ago- 2007, she noted that any person living in Gaza is 23% more likely to be poorer than a West Bank resident; To match the West Bank education, they need to have at least 7,500 more teachers and 4,700 more classes. For Gaza to be able to reach access to health care in the year of 2010 (maintain the same level as in 2006), they need to have 425 more doctors. Furthermore, they need 520 more nurses and 465 new hospital beds. Gaza, especially after evacuation of Jewish settlements in 2005 became a prison, a huge open-air prison, without food security. Gaza is the place in the Middle East where poverty is at the level of Sub-Saharan countries in Africa

Gaza’s borders are heavily fortified with barbed wire and electronic surveillance. Israel and Gaza’s border with Egypt is one kilometer width and fourteen kilometer long. It is named “Philadelphi Corridor,” (the Israeli code name for a narrow Strip of land, some 100 meters wide and 14 km (8.7 miles) long, situated along the entirety of the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt), but Palestinian are calling it the “Salaheddin Path” (5). This purely military frontier, restricts movement and commuting with the inhabitants of the Sinai Peninsula.

After retreat from Gaza in 2005, it was transferred to Egypt. All the beaches in Gaza facing the Mediterranean Sea are under the full control of Israeli coast guards. In this way, the population of Gaza are imprisoned inside a completely closed borders and cannot get out of such cage without Israeli’s permission. To break down the walls of this prison, they have made tunnels through the “Philadelphi Corridor” for supplying their vital ingredients. They smuggle their livelihood necessities from Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. One of the stated targets of the Israeli army in the 22-day operation, was closing way of communicating with the world to Gaza prisoners. Palestinians are forced to rely on tunnels for essential supplies. Israel’s blockade has exacerbated these hardships.

 In November 2008, only 137 food trucks entered Gaza, compared to 564 daily in December 2005. That’s an average of 4.6 trucks per day. Two major food supplier organizations, the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and the World Food Program (WFP). UNRWA feeds almost 750,000 Gazans. They needed 15 trucks a day but between 5th and 30th of November of 2008, they could only bring 23 trucks (6% of the food needed). According to “John Ging”, Operations Director at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), lots of the people without it would starve. Since Dec. 18, 2008, the UN agency was forced to suspend all of its programs. The World Food Program, helping more than 200,000 people, faced the same dilemma. They were only able to drive 35 trucks out of 190. The trucks were forced to store it on Israeli soil. In December alone, they had to pay $150,000 worth of storage bill to Israel.

Gasoline shortages shuttered most bakeries, and hospitals faced life-threatening supply deficits. Gaza’s only power plant operated at minimal capacity, while Israeli authorities delayed critical turbine parts, further crippling energy access. Water and sewage systems collapsed under the blockade, with chlorine supplies far below required levels. The healthcare system, dependent on aid and smuggled fuel, also suffered from medicine shortages.

On November 13th, due to the exhaustion of gasoline, the Gaza’s only electricity plant was shut down in which caused its two turbine batteries empty. As a result, ten days later, when the fuel arrived, they were unable to operate the turbines. This was while about 100 spare parts ordered for turbines were sitting in a warehouse of the port of Ashdod for eight months stored for the Israeli authority’s clearance. The Israeli customs have given them the pretext that if any items stay in storeroom more than 45 days, they would be auctioned. The profits of the auction would be deposited in Israeli government’s account. In the week leading up to 30 November, 394,000 liters of gasoline were given to the power plant. That translates to 18% of the minimum amount that the Israeli government is legally required to allowed each week. The amount would be sufficient to run a turbine for two days only. ” Gaza Strip Distribution Company” announced that with the status quo, much of the Gaza Strip has electricity for up to 12 hours per day (6). Gaza’s hospitals were dependent on diesel and gas that flow through the tunnels of the Rafah area. They were smuggling from Egypt and Hamas taxed them. Since November 23, two Gaza’s hospitals relying on the needed gas, didn’t have necessary supplies for food.

Gaza’s “Coastal Municipalities Water Service” for importing chlorine, needed to seek permission from Israel. In late November, Israel agreed to 18 tons of requested chlorin whereas 200 tons was requests per week. In mid-December in Gaza and the north of the Gaza Strip, people had six hours of water, in every three days.

The World Health Organization (WHO) is a major supplier of the Medicine and medical needs in Gaza through the “Ministry of Health of Palestinian Authority”. The WHO complained about disruptions of medicines. In November, the Ministry of Health of the State administration in the West Bank instead of sending them to Gaza under the pretext of not having enough space in the warehouses, they sent them back. In the week leading up to 30^th of November, only one truck of medicine arrived from Ramallah to Gaza. It was the first shipment of medicine since early September. Another sample was that the fuel costs for Gaza’s sewage pumps paid by World Bank to State of Palestine, not to Hamas. But the World Bank complains that the relevant authority in Ramallah has not paid the budget since June.

In this dire context, Gaza remains a prison—a densely populated, resource-starved enclave under a crippling blockade. The ongoing humanitarian crisis underscores the urgent need for a resolution that respects the rights and dignity of its people.

Fire and Ceasefire above Gaza

The 22-day Israeli massacre in Gaza is comparable to the Nazis’ suppression of the Warsaw Ghetto, not a war in the literal sense but an undeniable planned genocide and war crime. Casualty figures from both sides demonstrate this truth. In those 22 days, Palestinian casualties exceeded 1,300, including 410 children and 104 women. Half of these casualties were children, women, and elders. In contrast, the total number of Israeli deaths was 13, of which nine were soldiers. There was speculation that some of these deaths were due to “friendly fire.” The number of injured Palestinians was 5,350, including 1,855 children and about 800 women. The number of injured on the Israeli side was reported as fewer than 84 people.

In the Israeli bombardment, 120,000 Palestinians lost their homes, and at least 20,000 buildings were damaged, while more than 4,000 homes were destroyed. Many hospitals were bombarded and heavily damaged. According to a report by the World Health Organization, several wards of the Al-Quds Hospital, a subsidiary of the Palestinian Red Cross, were destroyed in the bombing on January 15. A United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Mission report on January 18 indicated that more than 50 UN aid and work centers were damaged.

In Gaza, there is no shelter or siren system to alert people during bombings. As a result, the UN agency had to provide shelter to more than 50,000 homeless people. Many of these shelters are schools, and their population density has reached unbearable limits. Several hospitals, 18 schools, universities, government buildings, mosques, courts, bridges, roads, power plants, and water and sewage facilities were among the targets of the bombs.

Today, Gaza is a place where, as the saying goes, it is “not to weep for the dead, but for the living.” According to a UN report, 50% of Gaza’s children have lost their will to live due to the shock and horrors they have endured (7).

Israel, with the help of its powerful global propaganda machine, claims it does not intend to harm civilians but aims to break and crush Hamas’s military capability. However, there is substantial evidence that this is a calculated falsehood reminiscent of Goebbelsian propaganda (8).

Most independent analysts reject Israel’s claim, citing numerous examples:

1. Israel’s leaders knew that a massive military attack on an area as densely populated as Gaza would, even with the most advanced and calculated weapons, inevitably lead to mass civilian casualties.
2. Israel’s leaders knew all Palestinian armed forces, including those affiliated and not affiliated with Hamas, operate in crowded residential areas without dedicated military complexes. Specifically, Hamas’s military branch, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, operates underground and uses camouflage among civilians (9). Mouin Rabbani (10), explained: “never left the realm of the underground and practiced its movement primarily through the presence of camouflage among people”.
3. If Israelis truly sought to minimize civilian casualties, they would have avoided surprise attacks on densely populated areas. For example, during the initial attack, they struck in the early hours of the day when Gaza’s streets were crowded. Noam Chomsky noted, “A little before noon, when the children were out of school and the streets of Gaza were crowded with people, killing more than 225 people and injuring over 700 took only a few minutes. A happy start to a mass slaughter of civilians trapped in a small cage with no place to go” (11). Saturday, December 27, was deliberately chosen for the attack to ensure complete surprise. No one expected the Israeli army to attack on a Saturday, a day when Jewish people traditionally refrain from work. Chomsky observed that two weeks after the attack began, with Gaza reduced to rubble and the death toll nearing 1,000, the UN reported that Israel closed border crossings on the pretext that it was a Saturday. This refusal to allow food and medical supplies into Gaza was juxtaposed with the slaughter of hundreds of Palestinians on the same holy day using American-made jets and helicopters.
4. In the final days of the war, the Israeli army continued its punitive tactics, targeting civilians, including women and children. Jonathan Cook, an English freelance journalist and expert on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, reported that even after military targets associated with Hamas were destroyed, Israeli forces expanded their attacks to civilians and civilian infrastructure. He continued that one of the top officials saying: “There are many aspects of Hamas, and we are trying to hit all of those areas، because everyone one of them are connected to each other and all of them support the terrorism against Israel” (12). When advancing on the ground, the Israeli tanks even knocked down the ordinary people houses. Without the doubt, multiple reports were indicating that, the Israeli soldiers, in some areas lined up women and children and killed every single one of them International Red Cross managers, known for their neutrality, accused Israel of war crimes (13).
5. The use of extensive bombardments and prohibited weapons like white phosphorus in urban areas without doubt indicates a deliberate attempt to harm civilians. White phosphorus, which causes severe burns, is considered a war crime under international conventions. Additionally, reports suggest the use of Dense Inert Metal Explosives (DIME), experimental American-made weapons that cause devastating injuries, often leading to cancer or death. It seems they are in an experimental phase and Gaza is a ginny pig (14). This is a weapon that melts organs, soft tissues and wounds. It is a kind of round metal particle used, visible in an autopsy but is not possible to trace them with X-rays and if the victims survive, they may get cancer.  Norwegian doctors Eric Fosse and Mads Gilbert, who treated victims in Gaza, described these injuries as unprecedented and distinct from those caused by conventional weapons (15). “Dr. Sobhi Sheikh” the surgical ward of Shafa Hospital (speaking to the British Independent) claimed that he had performed quite successful operation on these patients, but surprisingly many patients died two hours after the operation. Given the same losses, among the wounded in the Gaza’s war, Amnesty International called on Israel to identify the weapons in addition to the white phosphorus used in Gaza, so doctors could understand and unexplained wounds and use more appropriate treatments. According to some reports, in this attack, Israeli widely dumped uranium munitions in which Saudi Arabia asked the International Atomic Energy Agency to investigate it. Of course, Israel denied the use of unconventional weapons in Gaza. Even though Israel has denied the use of white phosphorus, a few days after the end of the war, under pressure by human rights groups, apparently promised to inquire about it!
6. Israeli leaders’ preparations for this assault focused on the mass killing of civilians rather than achieving clear military objectives. Jonathan Cook (reporting on this issue since 2001), said that right after Hamas’s victory in elections in January 2006 an extensive attack on Gaza seemed imminent but the Israeli government, despite public support refused to strike directly, because they knew Gaza well. It is a giant refugee camp with a very narrow alleys where “Merkava tanks” (16) couldn’t get pass, and Israeli soldiers can’t get through without the enemy’s fire. Gaza always had been a death trap for Israelis. In preparation for the attack, “Ehud Barak” had in mind the second Intifada in 2002 and the summer war of 2006 to fight Hezbollah. In the first war the Israeli army had suffered a high casualty while occupying “Janine’s refugee camp” and latter in ground invasion of southern Lebanon. In a country like Israel caution plays an important role in the war, because rising death tolls could quickly drive public opinion against the leaders. None of the Israel’s top leaders thought that it was possible to eradicate Hamas’ influence in Gaza through a ground war. To overthrow Hamas required a permanent occupation of Gaza. It would translate the returning to the period before “Ariel Sharon’s” retreat from Gaza in the summer of 2005 which was very costly to Israel. For this reason, the mass killing of civilians was the center of the planned attack.

Ilan Pappé, a prominent Israeli historian and dissident, noted that Israel spent $45 million in 2006 building a replica of Gaza in the Negev Desert for military training (17). This preparation highlights that the civilian toll in Gaza was not an unintended consequence but a calculated strategy. “Ehud Barak” visited Israeli troop in training that replica city a week prior to launching air strike on Gaza. “Pappé” recalls that Gaza since June 1967 has been an issue for Israel’s leaders.  They were hoping to force the inhabitants to migrate or to move to Sinai Peninsula. It was their wish that after the Oslo Agreement, Gaza gradually became a ghetto. That’s why Israelis knew what they were doing in this war.

During the preparation period for the invasion of Gaza, the “Dahiya Doctrine” (18) was the guideline for Israeli strategists, and Israeli military leaders mentioned it repeatedly. This term originates from the summer 2006 war in Lebanon. “Dahiya” or “Dahya,” an Arabic name meaning suburbs, refers to Israel’s strategy in that war. The principle was to make life intolerable for Lebanese Shiites and break Hezbollah’s social base to isolate them. Following this logic, in the summer of 2006, the Israeli Air Force practically razed the Shiite part of the Beirut suburb to the ground. On October 4, 2008, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz quoted General Gadi Eisenkot, the military commander of northern Israel, saying that what happened in Dahiya-Beirut in 2006 would happen to every village and would continue until no civilian villages remained, only military bases. He stated this was not advice but an approved plan.

Haaretz, in an article by Gabriel Siboni, the Israel defense forces reserve service (19) reported that according to Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, the lessons of the 2006 Lebanon war recommended striking a disproportionate blow to the enemy’s weaknesses, including economic interests, power centers, civilian infrastructure, and government structures. The aim was to create devastating damage that would require lengthy and costly reconstruction (20). A similar plan was made by General Giora Eiland, a retired Major General of the Israel Defense Forces and former head of Israel’s National Security Council (21). He also advocated demolishing entire infrastructures. Earlier, on February 29, 2008, Israeli politician and former major general Matan Vilnai warned (22) that continued rocket fire would lead to a “Shoah”—a Hebrew word for catastrophe (23).

Jonathan Cook explained that Ehud Barak and Matan Vilnai formulated a military strategy in March 2008, which was later agreed upon by the Israeli government. They concluded that the entire population of Gaza was complicit in Hamas’s actions, justifying retaliation against civilians. The Jerusalem Post reported that Israeli decision-makers believed overthrowing Hamas was meaningless because “the people are Hamas.” Barak and Vilnai sought legal grounds to justify ground and air bombardments of Gaza’s civilian neighborhoods. Vilnai suggested declaring the entire Gaza Strip a war zone, enabling the army to act with impunity and expecting civilians to flee the area.

After 22 days of massacring defenseless Gazans, on January 18, Israel unilaterally declared a ceasefire. This move resembled the unilateral retreat of the summer of 2005 under Ariel Sharon, which turned Gaza into a prison. The ceasefire allowed for intermittent, long-term destruction and freed Israel from the restrictions of bilateral or multilateral agreements, making it the sole enforcer and arbiter. Israel’s disregard for UN Security Council resolutions underscored its unilateralism makes it easier to get the message of all Israel wished for. Why Israel ignored the UN resolution, in spite of knowing it would declare the cease fire? Has it not yet achieved its goals? We know that by accepting that resolution, Israel could indeed display to the security council and the “international community” that is paying attention to the public opinion; But Israel knew that a unilateral ceasefire was the only way in which they could grow and prosper. As they say to “keep the scissors in their hands and cut what they wish to cut”. This ceasefire provided the same goal for Israel’s as the 22 days of horrific bombardment. Repeated violations of one-sided ceasefire on behalf of Israel itself over the past month did not left room for doubt, like the withdrawal from Gaza that Israel, undisputedly, is sole decision maker in relation to destiny of the Palestinians. Many people reminded us that Ariel Sharon’s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza pretended that there is no one or group on the side to be negotiated with. By unilateral withdrawal the Israeli leaders had another thought: They wanted to show that Israel has not commitment to any international entity about the occupied territories. Finally, let’s not forget that Israel is the only country in the world that has no official boundaries and does not wish to have any.

The immediate result of Israel’s one-sided ceasefire was the devastation of Gaza, leaving its reconstruction as one of the most difficult tasks in the world. Patrick Cockburn, an English journalist and Middle East expert, remarked that while Gaza was devastated in three weeks, rebuilding would take years (24). Israel’s plan, however, was to ensure ongoing erosion of Gaza’s resources, making even pre-December 27, 2008, conditions unbearable. Israel opposed reconstruction, fearing it would signal a victory for Hamas. The U.S. and EU also refused to negotiate with Hamas, contributing to the impossibility of repairing the damage.

What Israel is After?

What was the purpose of the 22-day Israeli invasion of Gaza? To answer, we must differentiate between Israel’s direct involvement and its ultimate goal. Otherwise, prevail logic strategy of Israel would remain unclear.

Without a doubt, accepting Israel’s justification for this invasion is nothing but complicity with Israel. There are two reasons that Israel has constantly pushed for it to confront rocket fire from Gaza into southern Israel and to destroy weapons-smuggling tunnels in Rafah: 

The first reason, which Israel’s propaganda machine largely focused on, is fundamentally baseless—even Israel’s closest allies would not defend it. It should be noted that rockets fired by Palestinians from Gaza do not pose a significant threat to Israel. Jimmy Carter, the former President of the United States, recalled in an article on January 9, 2009, that total Israeli casualties in Sderot, the target of most rockets launched from Gaza, amounted to three people over the past seven years. Israel’s foreign ministry announced the figure as 17 people. Regardless of the damage, the question remains whether the conflict could be resolved through negotiation. The answer is clear: Palestinian rocket attacks resulted in minimal Israeli casualties, making the threat negligible and generally is in response to Israel’s bloody attacks.

Mark LeVine reported on Al Jazeera English that, since the beginning of the second intifada, 79% of all armed engagements between Palestinians and Israelis were initiated by Israel, with only 8% by Hamas and other Palestinian groups (25). Moin Rabbani, writing for the Middle East Report on January 7, 2009, quoted Israeli sources showing that during the 2008 ceasefire, rocket fire dropped from 2,278 in the previous six months to 329. Most of these occurred in the first ten days of the ceasefire after Israel broke it on November 4, 2008, while Hamas was working toward a peaceful resolution. Additionally, the blockade of Gaza—one of the main conditions of the six-month ceasefire—was never implemented by Israel from the very beginning.

The second reason Israel presented was even weaker. The weapons smuggled through the Rafah tunnels consisted of light arms that could not serve as a defense against Israel’s military power. If Israel lifted the blockade on Gaza and ended its control over the area, the active Palestinian groups in Gaza would hesitate to act against Israel. This hesitation would stem not only from the lack of public support but also from active opposition among Gazans. Furthermore, the most effective way to control arms trafficking would be through cooperation with Egypt. Israel’s leaders knew that Mubarak’s regime was a reliable ally, particularly against Hamas.

In summary, Israel’s stated reasons were mere pretexts to justify preemptive crimes and conceal the true purpose of its actions.

Some attribute the 22-day invasion to the interests of Israeli coalition parties in the February 10 elections. While the Kadima coalition and the Labor Party (26) undoubtedly benefitted from the timing, the planning for the invasion began well before the ceasefire agreement of June 2008. Gideon Levy, a Haaretz columnist, explained in an interview on Democracy Now! that Israel undertook a similar operation in Lebanon in 2006, despite the absence of elections at that time. This suggests that significant government interests were at stake beyond electoral gain.

Analysts familiar with Israeli policies have highlighted specific objectives behind the invasion, reflecting Israel’s discriminatory nature. Roman Finkelstein identified two primary motives: restoring Israel’s “deterrence capacity” and neutralizing the threat of a Palestinian “peace attack.”

Knowledgeable analysts, who understand Israel’s policies, carefully monitored its strategy during the 22-day invasion. They identified specific objectives that illuminate Israel’s discriminatory nature. Roman Finkelstein highlighted two main motives for the offensive: first, restoring Israel’s “deterrence capacity,” and second, neutralizing the danger of a Palestinian “peace attack.”

To explain the first motive, Finkelstein cited Israeli sources stating that maintaining “deterrence capacity” has always been a cornerstone of Israel’s strategic doctrine. However, Israeli leaders now feel that their adversaries no longer fear them as they once did. This sentiment arises from events such as Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000, its failure to defeat Hezbollah militarily, and its losses in the 2006 war with Hezbollah, which undermined the myth of an infallible Israeli army. The invasion aimed to dismantle Gaza’s administrative infrastructure, bolster the morale of Israeli forces, and instill fear of Israel’s military power among Arab populations. Gilbert Achcar similarly noted that the rising popularity of Hezbollah and Hamas among Arab masses concerned not only Israel but also pro-American Arab regimes such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Israel sought to weaken Hamas’ support and reshape regional political dynamics to its advantage.

To explain the second motive, Finkelstein pointed to Hamas’ shift toward a policy of coexistence with Israel within the 1967 borders and its efforts to uphold and extend the ceasefire. In March 2008, Khaled Mashaal announced in an interview that Hamas was open to an agreement based on the 1967 borders. A former Mossad leader admitted that Hamas was willing to accept these borders as the temporary boundaries of a Palestinian state. Yual Diskin, former director of Israel’s Shin Bet security service, acknowledged that Hamas had tried to secure the six-month ceasefire and persuade other Palestinian groups to follow suit. Diskin argued that Hamas’ evolving stance provided Israeli leaders with an excuse to evade acceptance of the two-state solution and prompted them to attack Gaza to halt these changes.

Finkelstein reminded readers of Israel’s history of obstructing peace efforts. For instance, in June 1982, when the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) accepted the two-state formula, Israel launched an attack targeting Palestinians and Lebanese civilians. The primary aim was to crush the PLO as a political force capable of establishing a state in the West Bank and Gaza.

Noam Chomsky, like Finkelstein, noted that just before the six-month ceasefire ended on December 19, Hamas proposed extending it until June. This proposal, made through Robert Pastor, a former U.S. official in the Carter administration, was ignored by Israel. Chomsky also cited Akiva Eldar, an Israeli diplomatic correspondent, who reported that a few days before Israel’s invasion on December 27, Khaled Mashaal on the website of “Izz al-Din al-Qassam” (Hamas’ military wing) not only announced that they were willing to cease the hostilities but return to the 2005 agreement on controlling the Rafah crossing (the agreement in the period prior to Hamas’ election victory). This agreement involved joint management by Egypt, the European Union, the Palestinian Authority, and Hamas, aiming to provide Gaza with much-needed resources.

Jonathan Cook argued that Israel’s goal in the 22-day invasion was to weaken Hamas politically and militarily without reoccupying Gaza. While a decisive victory was unrealistic, Israel sought to discredit Hamas without fully overthrowing its regime. The fear of opening Gaza to extremist groups like al-Qaeda influenced this decision.

Israel had four specific goals during the invasion:

1. Tightening the siege of Gaza: Despite Egypt’s shared interests with Israel, public opinion in Egypt and other Arab nations opposed this strategy. Israel sought American and European involvement in controlling the Rafah crossing to enforce the blockade more effectively.
2. Reducing Gaza to a humanitarian issue: Sarah Roy, a Harvard University professor (27), argued that Israel’s long-term goal was to depoliticize Gaza’s population, rendering them powerless and devoid of political identity. The beggars who have no identity and have no political agenda and therefore they can’t be political. Israel attempted to implement the Matan Vilnai plan (28), which aimed to relocate Gaza’s residents from its northern and southern borders to its center, creating buffer zones under Israeli control.
3. Isolating Gaza from the West Bank: It was launched about a year before by Barack and Vilnai, suggested that Israel shuts down the roads to Gaza (except the Rafah crossing) thus gradually takes away any responsibility related to the ways of reaching the people of Gaza. A special power plant is under construction near the Sinai Peninsula and Israel wants to transfer its responsibility to Egypt.  Ghassan Khatib, a Palestinian politician (29), believed Israel’s strategy was to sever Gaza from the West Bank politically and physically, ultimately relegating Gaza to Egyptian control. This plan weakened Mahmoud Abbas’ regime, paving the way for Israeli concessions in East Jerusalem and continued settlement expansion.
4. Addressing regional dynamics: Israel’s broader concerns included countering Iran’s growing regional influence and potential nuclear capabilities. Israel feared that Iran’s support for Hezbollah and Hamas, along with its opposition to Israeli policies, would strengthen Arab resistance and complicate its plans for annexation in the West Bank.

Despite claims by Ehud Olmert, Israel’s then-prime minister (30), that the invasion achieved its objectives, Hamas declared victory. Analysts agreed that while Israel intensified its “Doctrine of Dahya” harsher in Gaza (more abominable than in Lebanon), it failed to break Hamas. Instead, Mahmoud Abbas’ organization emerged severely weakened, and support for Hamas grew among Palestinians and Arab populations.

When “Barack Obama” on his first day of presidency called Mahmoud Abbas to give his support, “Robert Fisk”, one of the most well-informed western writers on the Middle East wrote: “Perhaps Obama thought “Mahmoud Abbas” is the leader of the Palestinians, but Mr. Abbas himself knows that he is the leader of a ghost state, a species carcass-like, that is alive by International’s blood transfusion (support). Similarly, Patrick Cockburn reported from the West Bank that the Gaza conflict marked the beginning of Hamas’ ascendancy, akin to Fatah’s rise after the Battle of Karama in 1968. Mouin Rabbani, in an interview with Al Jazeera English on 17th January 2009, noted that after the ceasefire, Abbas’ primary struggle would be for his own political survival.

The 22-day invasion highlighted Israel’s discriminatory policies to the global public. It also sparked unprecedented criticism from Jewish communities against the Israeli government. However, it strengthened Israel’s far-right factions, as seen in the electoral committee’s temporary ban on Arab parties from participating in elections—a decision later overturned by Israel’s Supreme Court. In spite of that the climate of panic against Palestinians inside Israel exploded. Finally, it clouded the Palestinian issue.

While the invasion’s political costs were significant, it aligned with Israel’s broader strategy of preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state. Israeli leaders view this goal as a step-by-step process, requiring ethnic cleansing and extensive violence. During the Gaza bombings, Israeli Prime Minister, Shimon Peres openly dismissed global public opinion, emphasizing Israel’s intent to delay the formation of a Palestinian state.

Israel’s Strategic Advancement in the Destruction of the Palestinian Nation

A brief examination of Israel’s actions in ethnic cleansing and the dispersal of Palestinians provides a clear impression of the different stages and strategies employed. Israel officially identifies itself as a Jewish state. Judaism, which is often misunderstood as solely a religion, also represents a faith-based national identity (31). Jewish people believe they are descendants of Jacob, and as a result, non-Jewish people cannot attain equal citizenship and rights in Israel. Consequently, Israel functions as a racial-religious state.

This racial-religious government was established in a region where, prior to Israel’s creation, the majority population consisted of Arabs. Displacing Arabs from their lands was a crucial step in establishing the state for Jewish people. In 1918, Palestine had approximately 700,000 Arabs and 60,000 Jewish people. By 1938, the Arab population had grown to about 1,070,000, while the Jewish population had increased to 460,000—a growth rate of 766% for the latter compared to 30% for the former.

In 1948, the United Nations passed a resolution dividing Palestine, then under British mandate, into two parts: 56% for the Palestinians and 44% for Jewish people. At the time, Jewish people were a minority, and many were immigrants. Jewish armed forces exploited this resolution, using ethnic cleansing to forcibly remove 78% of Palestinians from their homes. The remaining 22% of Palestinian land was occupied following the 1967 war.

The State of Israel, through its Law of Return (July 1950), promised land to all Jewish people worldwide. Regardless of their country of residence, they could become citizens upon moving to Israel (32). Since then, Israel has encouraged Jewish immigration from around the globe, while applying systematic pressure to displace Palestinians. Gabriel Piterberg, an Israeli writer, dissident and professor at UCLA), states, ” To this day, what structurally defines the nature of the Israeli state is the return of Jewish people and the non-return of Arabs to Palestine. If this dynamic of return/non-return were to disappear, the Zionist state would lose its identity” (33).

Under the Oslo Agreement (1993), Israel ostensibly agreed to recognize Palestinian autonomy and return land in stages, based on the 1967 borders, contingent on the PLO withdrawing from conflict. However, Israel openly declared its refusal to return to the 1967 borders, particularly emphasizing that Jerusalem is its “eternal and indivisible capital.” Following this, Israel expedited settlement expansion in the most desirable areas of the West Bank. This expansion not only seized Palestinian land but also disrupted the geographic continuity of territories meant to be returned to Palestinians.

Eight years after Oslo, Edward Said criticized the agreement, calling it “a total surrender of Arafat to Israel.” Writing in New Left Review (September/October 2001- 34), he noted that the occupied territories had been fragmented into 63 sections with dedicated road networks serving 140 Jewish settlements, roads that Palestinians were barred from using. Palestinians faced daily inspections, humiliation, and restricted movement.

Despite promises under Oslo, only 18% of the occupied land was returned to Palestinians. According to B’Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories strives for a future in which human rights, liberty and equality (35), during the first seven years after Oslo, Jewish settlements in the West Bank expanded by about 100%, excluding land near East Jerusalem. By the second Intifada’s start in 2000, the Israeli military controlled 60% of the West Bank, sharing 27% with the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Jewish settlers controlled 80% of the water in occupied territories, while Palestinian income per capita fell by 25%.

Settlement Roads and the Wall

The network of roads connecting Jewish settlements consumed over 40% of the West Bank, leaving much of the area inaccessible to Palestinians, even though the settlers themselves occupied only 3% of the land. The separation wall, spanning 723 kilometers—twice the length of the 1949 Green Line—further divided the West Bank into isolated zones. Only 14% of the wall followed the Green Line (ceasefire line of 1949), with 86% built within the West Bank itself. It divided West Bank into four unrelated zones.

Patrick Cockburn described the difficulty of travel in the West Bank, noting that “going somewhere even in 50 Kilometers from Ramallah, takes more than an air travel from Jordan to Ankara”. He quoted the mayor of Nablus that many residents had been effectively imprisoned in their homes for over eight years, with only 3% able to leave.

In addition to all of these, the Jews often make life more difficult for Palestinians. These intimidations often accompany the approval of the government officials. The United Nations’ “Human Accord Office Friendly ” (OCHA) reports that: 80 to 90 percent of complaints by Palestinian Authority against action by the Jewish settlers is being ignored by Israeli police (36). For example, in the city of “Hebron”, a Palestinian city in the southern West Bank, 30 kilometers south of Jerusalem, a Jewish population of 500, from time to time attacking Palestinians of 130,000 people. They create a situation where most Palestinian are not able to come out of their homes.

Even Mahmoud Abbas’ complete surrender to the Bush administration’s plan has failed to expand slowing down Jewish settlements. “Mostafa Barghouti”, the Secretary-General of the Palestinian National Initiative, stated that after Bush administration’s propaganda and rhetoric in Annapolis Conference (November 2007) Israeli attacks on Palestinians have increased dramatically. It increased over 50% in the West Bank, other cities and road inspections.

Life in Gaza

The Gaza Strip faced unique challenges under Israeli policy. David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, reportedly wished for Gaza to “sink into the Mediterranean” (37). Ilan Pappe quotes from Levi Eshkol (Prime Minister of Israel in the 1967 War): “Gaza” is a problem. I was there in 1956, and I’ve seen poison snakes walking through the streets, we should resettle them in the Sinai Peninsula hoping the rest be able to immigrate to other parts of the country (38). In 1967, Israel integrated Gaza’s economy into its own, exploiting cheap Palestinian labor while confining the area to conditions akin to South Africa’s apartheid-era Bantustans (39).

Gaza became a focal point of Palestinian resistance during the first Intifada (1987–1993). Following the Oslo Agreement, Israel began delegating administrative responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority but maintained military control over the region.

Israel, with attention to the experience of the Intifada, changed its previous plan on Gaza. It used the opportunity, created through the Oslo Agreement, under the pretext of transferring Palestinian affairs to the Palestinian authority, instead of using Gazans, employed migrant from Asia and eastern Europe. As a result, the Gaza’s economy that has been appeased for more than a quarter of a century by the Israeli economy faced with an unprecedented crisis. However, Israel still was not satisfied with the pressure. They began limiting the connection of Gaza to other parts of the occupied territory in the process of the peace process (1993 – 2000). It practically established the area as a controlled refugee camp. In fact, the closure of Gaza’s borders began well before the second Intifada, turning the area into an internment camp and had nothing to do with the Palestinian suicide bombers.

From 2000 to 2005, even though the Israeli army had been interfering with the daily life of the Palestinians throughout the territory, turning it into an unbearable hell. The pressure on Gaza was obviously heavier. Despite all the repression at the second Intifada, Israeli government discovered that the suppression of Palestinians resistance in Gaza are more difficult and less productive. In the five-year period, while the Jewish settlers in Gazans were less than 1% of the total population,10 percent of Israelis were killed in connection with intifada and more than 40 the total number of Israeli casualties were linked to Gaza. According to this finding some of Israel’s harshest elites under leadership of Ariel Sharon’s, decided to force out Jews from Gaza so they could break its inhabitant.

Darryl Li, a Middle East researcher from Harvard University in an article titled “Backwards Disengagement and the Frontiers of Zionism” MERIP Magazine, date on 16 February 2008, wrote that post-withdrawal, Gaza was treated less like an internment camp and more like an animal pen (40).

Li divided Israel’s policies toward Gaza into three phases: The Bantustan period (1987–1993), the internment camp period (1993–2005), and the “animal pen” period following 2005.

• Bantustan period (1987-1993) in which Israel used its military rule to incorporate Gaza’s economy and infrastructure forcibly into its own, while treating the Palestinian population as a reserved cheap migrant.
• internment camp period (1993-2005) Gaza was encircled with barbed wire and multiple permanent terminals to control people’s traffic. Israel delegated some administrative functions to the Palestinian Authority (PA), but according to the Oslo agreement, the Palestinian Authority must work under the supervision of the Israeli army. From 2000 to 2005, Gaza contained less than 1 percent of the Jewish population but accounted for approximately 10 percent of Israeli intifada-related fatalities (and more than 40 percent of all Israeli combatant deaths). Gaza’s skies and beaches are under full military control; The economic system, taxes and the balance of trade are still in the hands of Israelis. Water, electricity and communications infrastructure continued to be dependent on Israel, and even the population record is in the hands of the Israeli authorities, However, the Israeli government, as an occupying power, has no responsibilities of any kind. It is called a closed camp.
• Animal pen is another indicator in Li’s view as how the goods arrive from three crossing between Israel and Gaza:  Karni crossing is the sole official crossing point for commercial traffic between the Gaza Strip and Israel, a highly fortified facility straddling the frontier on the site of an old British military airfield near Gaza City. Karni has approximately 30 lanes for handling different types of cargo — from shipping containers to bulk goods — needed to meet the diverse needs of a modern economy. Karni is a creature of the “Oslo” period, concretizing its logic of impressive spectacle and laborious inefficiency in order to balance Israeli control with the image of Palestinian autonomy. The crossing operates on the wasteful principle of “back-to-back” transport: Goods are left by one party in a walled-off no man’s land and then picked up by the other without any direct contact, essentially doubling shipping costs. In recent months, Israel has completely shut down Karni except for occasional shipments of wheat, grain and animal feed. (At the end of March 2011 Israel permanently closed the Karni Crossing).  At the same time, Israel has routed a few types of permitted “essential items” mostly through the Kerem Shalom (border crossing at the junction of two border sections: one between the Gaza Strip and Israel, and one between the Gaza Strip and Egypt) and Sufa crossings (closed permanently by Israel in 2008), further south. Unlike Karni, Kerem Shalom and Sufa were operated entirely by Israel and they made no gestures toward Palestinian partnership” (same 40).

Goods entering Gaza were funneled through heavily controlled border crossings like Karni and Kerem Shalom. Human rights lawyer Raji Sourani Raji Sourani”, human rights lawyer and the director of the Palestinian Center for Human Rights named a Prisoner of Conscience by Amnesty International during his 1988 detention (41) that during his 3-year sentence in a Gaza prison, he was tortured. Three more imprisonments in 1985 and 1986 followed (42).

Li described Israel’s policy of “Israel is also selectively disengaging from other economic relations with Gaza: “Major Israeli banks have announced their intention to sever ties with Gaza, and Israel, since autumn, has limited the inflow of US dollars and Jordanian dinars, endangering Gazans’ ability to purchase imports and make use of remittances….The notion of “essential humanitarianism” reduces the needs, aspirations and rights of 1.4 million human beings to an exercise in counting calories, megawatts and other abstract, one-dimensional units measuring distance from death” (43).

This is not a single individual’s review of Israeli policy in Gaza; Many Palestinian analysts have expressed similar findings. For example, Sara Roy emphasized, “Without external access to jobs and the right to emigration—something the Gaza disengagement plan and Olmert’s realignment plan effectively deny—the Strip will remain a prison unable to engage in any form of economic development” (44). Mary Robinson, High Commissioner for Human Rights at the United Nations, stated that even before the Gaza invasion on November 4, 2008, Israeli policy on Gaza amounted to the destruction of a civilization.

Gideon Levy, a columnist for Haaretz, observed, “It is all about dehumanization. As long as Israelis don’t perceive Palestinians as equal human beings, there will never be a real solution. Unfortunately, the dehumanization of Palestinians has become the best tool to strengthen the occupation, to ignore and deny its crimes, and to enable Israelis to live in peace without any moral dilemmas” (45). Neve Gordon, a professor at Ben-Gurion University, added, “Unlike raising animals for slaughter on a farm, the Israeli government maintains Palestinian assistance so that it can have a free hand in attacking them. Just as Israel provides basic foodstuffs to Palestinians while continuing to shoot them, it informs Palestinians—by phone—that they must evacuate their homes before F-16 fighter jets begin bombing them” (46).

It should be noted that although Israeli pressure on Gaza increased after Hamas’s coup d’état against Fatah in June 2007, Israel’s policy of stifling Gaza had been ongoing since August 2005 and was unrelated to Hamas coming to power. The goal of this policy was to disconnect Gaza geographically, politically, economically, and socially from other occupied territories, thereby making the formation of a Palestinian state impossible or postponing it indefinitely. Henry Siegman wrote in the London Review of Books (January 29, 2009) about Dov Weisglass, Sharon’s senior adviser, who stated in an interview with Haaretz (August 2004): “The greater lie is that Sharon’s withdrawal from Gaza was intended as a prelude to further withdrawals and a peace agreement. What I effectively agreed to with the Americans was that part of the settlements on the West Bank would not be dealt with at all. The significance of the agreement was freezing the political process. When you freeze the process, you prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state, and you prevent a discussion about the refugees, the borders, and Jerusalem. Effectively, this whole package that is called the Palestinian state, with all that it entails, has been removed from our agenda indefinitely. All of this was with President Bush’s authority and the ratification of both houses of Congress” (47).

Avi Shlaim, an Israeli-British historian of Iraqi Jewish descent, explained: “The real purpose behind the move was to redraw the borders of Greater Israel by incorporating the main settlement blocs in the West Bank into the state of Israel. Withdrawal from Gaza was thus not a prelude to a peace deal with the Palestinian Authority, but a prelude to further Zionist expansion in the West Bank” (48). Noam Chomsky, referencing Lords of the Land by Israeli historians Idit Zertal and Akiva Eldar, highlighted that after Israel withdrew its forces from Gaza in August 2005, the territory was not released “for even a single day from Israel’s military grip or from the price of the occupation that its inhabitants pay every day…… Israel left behind scorched earth, devastated services, and people with neither a present nor a future. The settlements were destroyed in an ungenerous move by an unenlightened occupier, which in fact continues to control the territory and kill and harass its inhabitants by means of its formidable military might—exercised with extreme savagery, thanks to firm U.S. support and participation” (49).

Israeli leaders believe the entirety of historic Palestine belongs to them, opposing the formation of a Palestinian state. Former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated in a speech to a joint session of the U.S. Congress (May 2006), “I believed, and to this day still believe, in our people’s eternal and historic right to this entire land” (50). However, Israeli leaders understand that achieving their “eternal and historic right” requires overcoming obstacles step by step.

After the Oslo Agreement, Israel implemented a system of exclusion and discrimination to suppress Palestinian struggles and prevent them from achieving their inalienable rights. This system effectively separated Gaza from the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In this discriminatory framework, Gazans, considered the lowest caste, have demonstrated remarkable resilience. Israel’s primary goal has been to sever ties between Gazans and other occupied territories, isolating their fate as a warning to others. In this context, Sara Roy wrote on January 1, 2009: “If Gaza falls, the West Bank will be next” (51).

If Israel prevents the establishment of a Palestinian state, the return of Palestinian refugees to their land will also be blocked. This will ultimately reduce Palestinians living in Israel to second-class citizens, stripping them of many rights. In recent Israeli elections, the most far-right slogans dominated campaigns. Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni declared, “The national aspirations [of the Arabs] should be realized elsewhere, but there is no question of carrying out transfers or forcing them to leave…… And among other things, I will also approach Palestinian residents of Israel—those whom we call Arab Israelis—and tell them: “Your national aspirations lie elsewhere” (52).

In summary, Israel’s blockade of Gaza, starting in the summer of 2005, coupled with intermittent invasions and ongoing restrictions, is a defining element of its broader strategy to thwart the establishment of a Palestinian state. By isolating Gaza, Israel aims to suppress Palestinian resistance as a nation.

How Can Israel Be Stopped?

The Palestinians, despite their similarities to Jewish people caught in the grip of the Nazis, have two crucial differences. The first difference is that the murder of European Jewish people during World War II occurred behind the scenes, whereas today, the tragedy of the Palestinians is unfolding in the era of global communication. It is taking place in a world where neither public opinion nor any government can remain unbiased or indifferent. Reflecting on this, Edward Said stated that despite distortions by governments and the media, most Americans and Europeans no longer accept Israel’s claim to a special moral position that denies Palestinians their human rights.

The second difference is that the issue of Palestine is profoundly international, making it impossible for the leaders of Israel or even the United States to ignore global perspectives on the elimination of indigenous peoples.

Today, the global Palestinian population is estimated at about 10 to 11 million, living in various countries. Approximately 6 to 7 million reside in Israel, the territories occupied during the 1967 war, and surrounding nations such as Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. Meanwhile, the total global Jewish population is estimated at around 13.5 million, with about 5.5 million living in Israel. Recent data suggests the worldwide Jewish population has risen to 25.5 million, with 7.7 million in Israel and 18 million outside it (Translator-53). Despite significant support for Israel among Jewish people worldwide and the influence of right-wing Israeli groups in Western power structures, Palestine remains central to Arab nationalism. This may be one of the largest-scale expressions of religious solidarity in the world.

There is no doubt that Israel’s powerful international supporters are among the world’s most influential players. However, these supporters understand that provoking confrontation with Arabs and Muslims is not in their best interest. Contrary to the neoconservative imagination in the United States, the balance sheet of the “War on Terror” over the past eight years demonstrates that victory for the U.S. and its allies remains uncertain. This has led to growing realism among American elites, many of whom are now concerned about the excessive influence of the “Israeli Lobby.” For example, Anthony Cordesman, a prominent U.S. military analyst and friend of Israel, wrote in a report to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on January 9, 2009, that “It is also far from clear that the tactical gains are worth the political and strategic cost to Israel. … they have disgraced themselves and damaged their country and their friends” (54).

The discrediting of Israel in Western public opinion becomes even clearer when examining recent events. Although Western governments and media remain biased, the massacres in Gaza have been profoundly shocking. Global public opinion, including that in the U.S. and Europe, is increasingly critical. Israeli journalist and peace activist Uri Avnery wrote: “What will be seared into the consciousness of the world will be the image of Israel as a blood-stained monster, ready at any moment to commit war crimes and not prepared to abide by any moral restraints. This will have severe consequences for our long-term future, our standing in the world, and our chance of achieving peace and quiet. In the end, this war is a crime against ourselves too, a crime against the State of Israel” (55).

Noam Chomsky echoed Avnery’s views, stating, “There is good reason to believe that he is right. Israel is deliberately turning itself into one of the most hated countries in the world and is also losing the allegiance of the population of the West, including younger American Jews, who are unlikely to tolerate its persistent shocking crimes for long. Decades ago, I wrote that those who call themselves ‘supporters of Israel’ are in reality supporters of its moral degeneration and probable ultimate destruction. Regrettably, that judgment looks more and more plausible” (56).

During Israel’s 22-day invasion of Gaza, shocking scenes of the tragedy faced by Gazans, broadcast by Al Jazeera, reached audiences in 105 countries. This exposed the hypocrisy and censorship of Western media. The moral blow to Israel’s reputation was exacerbated by unprecedented protests from a significant proportion of Jewish people in Western countries and Israel itself. For instance:

• On January 5, 2009, approximately 500 Israeli citizens, including renowned artists, writers, intellectuals, and professors, signed a petition condemning Israel’s crimes in Gaza. They demanded sanctions against Israel under international charters and cited the successful boycott of apartheid South Africa as a precedent.
• Noam Chomsky, addressing the claim that Israel has the right to defend itself from rockets fired from Gaza, argued that “Although rocket fire is a criminal act, but Israel has no right to defend itself militarily…. Nazi Germany had no right to use force to defend itself against the terrorism of the partisans. “Kristallnacht” was not justified by “Herschel Grynspan’s” assassination of a German Embassy official in Paris. The British were not justified in using force to defend themselves against the (very real) terror of the American colonists seeking independence, or to terrorize Irish Catholics in response to IRA terror – and when they finally turned to the sensible policy of addressing legitimate grievances, the terror virtually ended. It is not a matter of “proportionality,” but of choice of action in the first place: Is there an alternative to violence? In all of these cases, there plainly was, so the resort to force had no justification whatsoever. He stressed that “The invasion itself is a far more serious crime; And if Israel had inflicted horrendous damage by bows and arrows, it would still be a criminal act of extreme depravity”(57).
• French Jewish writer Jean-Moïse Braitberg, whose grandfather died in the Treblinka gas chambers and several members of his families also were killed in other Nazi German death camps, in a public letter (in Le Monde 28 January 2009) to Israel’s president demanded that his grandfather’s name be removed from memorials justifying cruelty against Palestinians. He, in that shocking letter. wrote:: “You see, since my childhood, I have lived in the entourage of survivors of the death camps. I have seen the numbers tattooed on their arms, I have heard the stories of torture; I have known the impossible mourning, and I have shared their nightmares. It was necessary, I was told, that these crimes never again occur; that never again should a man, strong in his belonging to an ethnic group or a religion, despise another, flout his most basic rights which are a dignified life in safety, the absence of obstacles, and the light, however distant, of a future of serenity and prosperity (58).
• Avi Shelaem” wrote: “As always, mighty Israel claims to be the victim of Palestinian aggression but the sheer asymmetry of power between the two sides leaves little room for doubt as to who is the real victim. This is indeed a conflict between David and Goliath, but the Biblical image has been inverted – a small and defenseless Palestinian David faces a heavily armed, merciless, and overbearing Israeli Goliath. The resort to brute military force is accompanied, as always, by the shrill rhetoric of victimhood and a farrago of self-pity overlaid with self-righteousness. In Hebrew this is known as the syndrome of bokhim ve-yorim (“crying and shooting”) (59).
• “Amireh Haas”, famous Israeli author and columnist for Haaretz newspaper, (daughter of parents who were both Holocaust survivors), wrote: “Lucky my parent aren’t alive to see this” (59).
• “Sarah Roy” (her parents both were Holocaust survivor) says “As Jews in a post-Holocaust world empowered by a Jewish state, how do we as a people emerge from atrocity and abjection, empowered and also humane, something that still eludes us” (60)?
• “Eric Hobsbawm” Famous Marxist historian referring to crimes Israel commits says: “(My mother) told me very firmly: ‘You must never do anything, or seem to do anything that might suggest that you are ashamed of being a Jew.’,  She told me very firmly: ‘You must never do anything, or seem to do anything that might suggest that you are ashamed of being a Jew……I have tried to observe it ever since, although the strain of doing so is sometimes intolerable, in the light of the behavior of the government of Israel” (61).

These voices indicate that the Palestinian cause can transcend religious and racial divides to gain widespread international support. However, for this to happen, Palestinians must reorganize their efforts to defend their rights effectively on an international level could only be proceeded by the Palestinians themselves.. While resistance to Israeli aggression remains essential, analysts argue that not all methods are equally effective or beneficial to the cause. Some of the following matters are of importance:

1 – Confrontation between Fatah and Hamas
The ongoing conflict between Fatah and Hamas is one of the most significant issues undermining the Palestinian resistance movement from within. This internal discord provides Israel and the United States with opportunities to pressure the movement. The confrontation is not solely ideological but has a strong political dimension. Mahmoud Abbas and much of Fatah’s leadership have adopted a conciliatory approach, often perceived as collaborating with Israel to fragment Palestinian lands. Conversely, Hamas insists on a full Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 war. Israel exploits Abbas and his allies’ conciliatory policies, attempting to turn the Palestinian police into a puppet force.

This dynamic became particularly evident in 2007. After violent clashes between Fatah and Hamas in Gaza, the two groups, mediated by Saudi Arabia, agreed to form a unity government. Hamas allowed key cabinet positions to be filled by Fatah members or technocratic allies and declared a ceasefire with Israel. However, the Bush administration sought to undermine this unity government. It pressured Abbas and supplied Israel with advanced weaponry to weaken Hamas (62). Before Muhammad Dahlan (former head of the Palestinian Authority’s security in Gaza) could execute an American-backed coup, Hamas preemptively countered with an anti-coup operation in June 2007, seizing control of Gaza, disarming and detaining Fatah forces. Abbas responded by disbanding Hamas and the National Unity Government and appointing Salam Fayyad as prime minister. This split allowed Israel to isolate Gaza from the West Bank via internal Palestinian divisions. This separation threatens the viability of the Palestinian resistance movement and Israel actively deepens it to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Can this confrontation be resolved? Progressive analysts and Palestinian sympathizers argue that Hamas’ seizure of Gaza was a strategic error. Gilbert Achcar, a Lebanese-French Marxist and Middle East analyst, stated: “……This by the way shows how serious an error was Hamas’s decision to seize full power in Gaza alone, thus separating the two Palestinian territories. Not that they should not have preempted the coup that “Dahlan” was busy organizing against them with US and Israeli backing, but they should not have wiped out all “Fatah’s” presence in PA institutions as they did. Whereas the strategic need is for the struggle to be built on a pan-regional level, the Palestinian scene itself has been fragmented into two segments. This is a pity” (63).

After the 22-day war, under pressure from the Palestinian and Arab’s public opinion, Fatah and Hamas resumed negotiations under the banner of “national reconciliation,” facilitated in Cairo, Egypt. Salam Fayyad’s resignation symbolized progress. However, tensions within the Palestinian Authority persist.

The lack of a clear political structure continues to hamper progress, as the PNA operates under the umbrella of the PLO, representing only Gaza and the West Bank in elections while excluding the vast Palestinian refugee population. Although the PLO is recognized by the United Nations General Assembly as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the PNA lacks sovereignty over its territories due to Israeli occupation. Under the Oslo Accords, the PA has full control only in Palestinian urban areas (Area A) and limited control in rural areas (Area B), while the rest (Area C) remains under Israeli authority (64).

The PLO’s assembly, established in 1964, consists of over 700 members, with West Bank and Gaza representatives forming less than a third. This structure allows most members, residing outside the 1967-occupied territories, to dominate decision-making. The executive committee, elected by the assembly, consists of 18 members from various Palestinian organizations. Hamas, not being a member of the PLO, is excluded from these processes. This exclusion has prompted Hamas to seek membership in the PLO while advocating for structural reforms.

The disjointed relationship between the PLO and PNA allows Palestinian political movements to bypass the demands of ordinary Palestinians, fostering corruption within Fatah, the autonomous government, and other political groups. Events like the 2007 Fatah-Hamas conflict and Israel’s 22-day invasion of Gaza (from December 27, 2008, to January 18, 2009, known as “Operation Cast Lead”” (65) highlight the need for unified and democratic Palestinian representation. Such representation would enable all Palestinians, regardless of residence, political, or religious beliefs, to participate in shaping their national destiny. Establishing democratic structures could resolve intergroup confrontations without violence and strengthen the resistance movement.

The 2005 presidential election and 2006 parliamentary election, described by international observers as “free and fair,” enhanced the credibility of the Palestinian resistance. In the presidential election, Mustafa Barghouti (66), despite eight times arrests, over six weeks election campaign, while detained and severely beaten by Israeli forces, garnered 20% of the vote. Mahmoud Abbas Fatah Organization received only 25% of the votes, and Hamas a third. The leftists and secular parties won about 34 percent of the vote. This division undermines efforts to resolve the Palestinian issue.

Evidence suggests that Palestinian support for Hamas stems from political, not religious, motivations. In 1993, Hamas had only 15% support. The corruption and compromises of the PNA government fueled Hamas’ rise. Despite the January 2006 elections showing limited support for enforcing Islamic law (1%) and strong support for peace (73%), Hamas’ steadfastness against Israeli policies garnered increased backing. By 2009, after Israel’s invasion of Gaza, 52% supported Hamas, compared to 13% for Fatah.

2 – Are the Resistance Movement and Armed Struggle Necessarily Synonymous?
This question has been increasingly raised in recent years, and the number of those who respond negatively to it is clearly on the rise. The reality is that the Palestinian resistance movement against Israel has always been closely tied to armed struggle, making the notion of unarmed resistance difficult for many within Palestinian politics. This association is a byproduct of the displacement of the majority of the Palestinian population, who were driven away from their homeland and faced the need to fight against the occupying force. They infiltrated occupied territories or targeted Israeli structures in various parts of the world. However, these actions have often led to several significant outcomes:

1. The overwhelming majority of Israeli people supported the violent policies of their government, which used these actions to justify its strategies.
2. Palestinian residents in the occupied territories often bore the brunt of Israeli retaliation for such operations.
3. The public opinion of countries where these armed struggles were carried out turned against the Palestinians.

The First Intifada, which began in 1987 and continued until 1993, demonstrated that mass struggle could be far more effective than armed struggle. Ordinary Palestinians, including children, played a significant role in it. Residents were able to deal more efficiently with the occupation forces, and grassroots organizations emerged, mobilizing entire civil society and creating a foundation for active democracy. Gilbert Achcar rightly observed that the peak of Palestinian efficiency during the 1988 “Stone Revolution” (the First Intifada) was achieved without guns, bombs, suicide attacks, or rockets—only through mass mobilization.

Unfortunately, the experience of the First Intifada did not become the dominant strategy within Palestinian political movements. This neglect manifested during the Second Intifada, which began in response to Ariel Sharon’s visit to Al-Aqsa Mosque. Armed operations by many political groups, particularly Hamas, historically occurred mainly in the occupied territories. These actions provided Sharon with the opportunity he had been waiting for. Moreover, the armed struggle during the Second Intifada exacerbated the divide between Fatah and Hamas, creating a catastrophic gap within the Palestinian resistance movement.

There is no doubt that the armed struggle of the Palestinians during the Second Intifada was more beneficial to Israel than to the Palestinians. It allowed Israel to respond with even more brutal violence against residents of the occupied territories. Additionally, the most significant consequence of this period was the construction of the separation barrier, widely known as the apartheid wall, which formalized the imprisonment of residents in the occupied territories.

The number of Palestinian analysts who favor unarmed struggle for the resistance movement is increasing. These analysts do not doubt the legitimacy of the struggle and do not support Mahmoud Abbas’s conciliatory policies. Instead, their arguments are based on the historical and specific circumstances of the Palestinian struggle. One such figure is Norman Finkelstein, who has consistently defended the legitimacy of Palestinian resistance and exposed Israeli policies. Another is Mustafa Barghouti, an intellectual leader in an article published in The Nation on February 7, 2009, Barghouti praised steadfastness and sustainability as the most significant elements of Palestinian identity. He wrote:

“From the 1920s onward, Palestinian resistance has been overwhelmingly nonviolent. The number of peaceful, unarmed Palestinian martyrs of this conflict is far outweighs those of us who have fought the enemy on its own violent terms. From boycotts to business and hunger strikes, from demonstrations to diplomacy. We Palestinians engaged daily in nonviolent struggle against the occupation of our land and the constant abuse of our dignity and despite the fact that our nonviolence goes unnoticed by a world biased in favor of our oppressor, we continue struggle unabated. We continue not because nonviolence, resilience and the steadfast pursuit of justice is a “strategy” but we hope one day it turn the tide of public opinion in our favor; We continue because this is who we are. It is our integrity that guides our struggle – not the constant humiliation and provocation of our oppressor…..This integrity, the justice of our cause and the means by which we pursue are the gravest threat to Israel and the Zionist agenda for our land – far graver than homemade rockets or suicide bombers. Israel understands this, and thus works hard to pervert this reality in the minds of Israelis and the international community……Their fear is evident in the means by which they suppress popular nonviolence throughout the West Bank. …… We are steadfast in our cause and in our methods. We are armed with truth, justice, signs, flags and sometimes stones – nothing more” (67).

3 – Influence of Other Governments on the Palestinian Movement
The occupation and displacement of the Palestinian population, combined with claims of helping the Palestinians, have enabled other governments to exert significant influence over the resistance. This has been a primary factor in fostering corruption within the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA). Additionally, this influence has played an important role in creating divisions among Palestinian political groups, depriving the resistance movement of unified leadership.

While it is undeniable that Palestinians under occupation and in exile across various countries need to engage with other peoples, such engagement must not undermine their independence in the struggle for self-determination. The resistance movement must avoid becoming an appendage to other governments. The only way forward is to build, expand, and continually recreate a democratic structure for decision-making and transparent accountability among Palestinians. There is no alternative.

4 – The Palestinian Resistance Movement and the Existence of the People of Israel
As noted earlier, Israel is a racially and religiously defined state. Sigman, a former executive director of the American Jewish Congress and a prominent Middle East analyst, revealed that “…the IDF finally had to open up and publish, that Israeli generals received direct instructions from “Ben-Gurion” during the war of Independence to kill civilians, or line them up against the wall and shoot them, in order to help to encourage the exodus, that in fact resulted, of 700,000 Palestinians, who were driven out of their—left their homes, and their towns and villages were destroyed….. “(68).

The racist and criminal policies of the Israeli government toward the Palestinians over the last six decades have deeply entrenched resentment among Palestinians and Arabs alike. One consequence of this has been the rise of religious nationalism and antisemitism, particularly over the past seven or eight years. Despite these divisions, the political strategy of the resistance movement must not ignore reality.

One such reality is that millions of Jewish people have emigrated to Israel over the past 80 years, forming a distinct nation. They speak a single language, Hebrew, and have created familial and social bonds. The nation of Israel differs from the global Jewish community or followers of Judaism, which have existed for centuries in various parts of the world. The majority of Israelis were born on this land, and their modern Hebrew language is associated with the formation of the state of Israel. The existence of the Israeli nation is an undeniable fact, and imagining its destruction is not only impractical but would require a horrific event akin to another Holocaust. The Jewish people who arrived in Israel during this period have nowhere else to go. Denying their existence would lead to further bloodshed and ethnic cleansing.

Although the state of Israel was established through bloodshed, crimes, and racial and ethnic discrimination, it is important to remember that many nation-states around the world were similarly created. Attempting to reverse time does not restore justice; it often perpetuates cycles of horrific crimes.

Every nation under occupation has the right to fight for self-determination and existence. However, if this same nation does not resist racism and ethnic cleansing, it weakens its moral standing and inadvertently aids the occupying forces. Antisemitism, for example, has historically benefited Israel, both morally and politically. After the 1948–49 war, many corrupt Arab governments retaliated by expelling Jewish people from their countries. The largest waves of expulsions resulted in mass Jewish immigration to Israel, which the Israeli government welcomed. This, in turn, facilitated the expulsion of more Palestinians from their land. In this sense, antisemitism unified Jewish people, strengthened Israel, and intensified Palestinian displacement.

Ahmadinejad’s Holocaust denial (President of Iran 2005–2013), for example, served as a political tool to appease certain Arab and Muslim audiences but ultimately gave Israel an opportunity to justify its actions against Palestinians. Both Israel and Holocaust deniers exploit the Holocaust for their own purposes: Israel to evade moral accountability and Holocaust deniers to delegitimize Israel. However, moral responsibility is universal and applies regardless of the Holocaust’s historical existence.

From a broader perspective, today’s Palestinians bear a resemblance to the Jewish people of Europe before the Holocaust. It is not language, religion, or common descent that unites them, but the shared experience of unjust bloodshed and suffering. Eduardo Galeano eloquently captured this sentiment when he dedicated a piece to “my Jewish friends assassinated by Latin American dictatorships that Israel advised” (69).

I must emphasize that Palestinians do not need to agree with the occupying power. Through their tireless and constant struggle, they can assert their right to self-determination. The issue is not the denial of Israel’s existence but Israel’s refusal to recognize the existence and rights of the Palestinian people.

Let us not forget that in December 2008, Israel, along with the United States and a few dependent governments, voted against the right to self-determination for the Palestinian nation, a resolution supported by 173 other governments. The problem for Palestinians is not merely armed struggle against Israel; it is Israel’s continued ethnic cleansing and slaughter. As Ilan Pappe noted, “In “Deir Yassin”, women and babies were also not spared. But the importance of the directives lies in the dehumanization of the Palestinians that was integrated into the orders dispatched to troops that in the next ten months or so would massacre thousands of Palestinians and expel almost a million of them (half of the country’s population), demolish their villages and destroy their towns.” (70).

At best, Israeli policy aligns with the words of General Moshe Ya’alon, who said: “”The Palestinian threat harbors cancer-like attributes that must be severed. There are all kinds of solutions to cancer. Some say it’s necessary to amputate organs but at the moment I am applying for chemotherapy.” (71). Or: “The Palestinians must be made to understand in the deepest recesses of their consciousness that they are a defeated people”. (72)

There is no “magic solution” to the deep-rooted racism within Israeli policies. This is precisely why the only viable path for Palestinians is to resist racism and forced displacement. They are in a sensitive position and must choose a struggle that garners the support of progressive societies, especially in Western countries where Israel retains strong backing, in defense of their legitimate cause.

Mohammadreza Shalgooni – March 23 2009

Translated by: Ali Abani & Bijhan V., December 2024

(Pictures are from internet, chosen by Ali. They are from the current situation in Gaza.)

1. https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/warsaw-ghetto-uprising
2. ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semitic_people): The meaning of “antisemitism” has changed to protect the Israeli’s genocide. It seems all western media and dictionaries have changed its meaning. In fact “Semitic” means: Semitic people or Semites is a term for an ethnic, cultural or racial group associated with people of the Middle East, including Arabs, Jews, Akkadians, and Phoenicians.
3. This is increased since the October 2022 (1.1 million People at Catastrophe level of hunger): https://www.wfp.org/emergencies/palestine-emergency
4. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/osginf2024d1_en.pdf
5. Salah ad-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub (c. 1137 – 4 March 1193), commonly known as Saladin, was the founder of the Ayyubid dynasty. An important Muslim ruler in Egypt. He later conquered Syria, Mesopotamia, and the western coast of Arabia in the 12th century. He fought the Crusaders for control of Jerusalem for twenty years, conquering the city in 1187 but losing it again in 1192 to Richard Lionheart in the Third Crusade …
6. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electricity_crisis_in_the_Gaza_Strip
7. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Children_in_the_Israeli%E2%80%93Palestinian_conflict
8. Karl Göbel (20 January 1900 – 2 March 1945) was a general in the Wehrmacht of Nazi Germany during World War II. He was a recipient of the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves.
9. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Qassam_Brigades.
10. Mouin Rabbani (Arabic: معين رباني) is a Dutch-Palestinian Middle East analyst specializing in the Arab-Israeli conflict and Palestinian affairs.
11. https://chomsky.info/20090119/
12. https://www.jonathan-cook.net/2009-01-18/devastation-has-always-been-a-goal-for-israel/
13. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ru/customary-ihl/v2/rule158
14. https://no.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dense_Inert_Metal_Explosive#Referanser
15. https://www.theguardian.com/society/2009/jan/16/gaza-norwegian-doctors
16. https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-israels-5g-merkava-tank-proves-itself-in-gaza-1001464723
17. https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v31/n01/ilan-pappe/israel-s-message
18. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dahiya_doctrine
19. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gabi_Siboni
20. https://www.quora.com/What-is-Israels-Dahiya-Doctrine
21. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giora_Eiland
22. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matan_Vilnai
23. https://www.memorialdelashoah.org/en/archives-and-documentation/what-is-the-shoah.html
24. https://www.the-independent.com/news/world/middle-east/gaza-was-demolished-in-three-weeks-rebuilding-it-will-take-years-1451411.html
25. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_LeVine
26. Kadima (Hebrew: קדימה, lit. ‘Forward’) was a centrist and liberal political party in Israel. It was established on 24 November 2005 by moderates from Likud largely following the implementation of Ariel Sharon’s unilateral disengagement plan in August 2005, and was soon joined by like-minded Labor politicians.
27. Sara Roy (EdD, Harvard University) is an Associate of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies specializing in the Palestinian economy, Palestinian Islamism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
28. Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Matan Vilnai, is the chair of Commanders for Israel’s Security and a former deputy chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces and deputy defense minister, as well as Israel’s ambassador to China from 2012 to 2017.
29. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghassan_Khatib
30. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ehud_Olmert
31. Judaism (Hebrew: יַהֲדוּת‎, romanized: Yahăḏūṯ) is an Abrahamic monotheistic ethnic religion that comprises the collective spiritual, cultural, and legal traditions of the Jewish people.
32. The Law of Return is an Israeli law, passed on 5 July 1950, which gives Jews, people with one or more Jewish grandparent, and their spouses the right to relocate to Israel and acquire Israeli citizenship.
33. https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii10/articles/gabriel-piterberg-erasing-the-palestinians
34. https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii11/articles/edward-said-the-desertions-of-arafat
35. https://www.btselem.org/about_btselem
36. https://www.unocha.org/publications/map/occupied-palestinian-territory/occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-settler-violence
37. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causes_of_the_1948_Palestinian_expulsion_and_flight#:~:text=%22From%20the%20UN%20partition%20proclamation,of%20Palestinians%20out%20of%20Israel.%22
38. https://mondoweiss.net/2017/11/liberal-contemplating-genocide/
39. Bantustan, any of 10 former territories that were designated by the white-dominated government of South Africa as pseudo-national homelands for the country’s Black African (classified by the government as Bantu).
40. https://merip.org/2008/02/disengagement-and-the-frontiers-of-zionism/
41. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raji_Sourani
42. https://rightlivelihood.org/the-change-makers/find-a-laureate/raji-sourani/
43. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Realignment_plan#:~:text=The%20realignment%20plan%20(Hebrew%3A%20%D7%AA%D7%95%D7%9B%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%AA,most%20Israeli%20settlements%20into%20Israel.
44. https://www.palestinechronicle.com/sara-roy-the-gaza-economy/
45. https://www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/opinion/israel-own-worst-enemy-levy/index.html
46. https://inthesetimes.com/article/gaza-in-the-crosshairs
47. https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v31/n02/henry-siegman/israel-s-lies
48. https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/israel/64132/all-that-remains
49. https://peacenews.info/node/3866/noam-chomsky-gaza
50. https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/prime-minister-olmert-speech-to-joint-session-of-congress-may-2006
51. https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v31/n01/sara-roy/if-gaza-falls
52. https://www.france24.com/en/20081212-livni-denies-wanting-expel-arab-israelis-
53. https://www.jewishagency.org
54. https://www.csis.org/analysis/war-gaza
55. https://newint.org/features/special/2009/01/12/gaza-war-crime-against-state-of-israel
56. https://chomsky.info/20090119/
57. https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2009/01/28/effacez-le-nom-de-mon-grand-pere-a-yad-vashem_1147635_3232.html
58. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/israel-and-gaza-rhetoric-and-reality/
59. https://www.haaretz.com/2009-01-07/ty-article/lucky-my-parents-arent-alive-to-see-this/0000017f-f6d3-d318-afff-f7f30f230000
60. https://www.palestinechronicle.com/sara-roy-a-jewish-plea/
61. https://lawrenceofcyberia.blogs.com/news/2012/10/quote-of-the-week-eric-hobsbawm.html
62. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/04/usa.israelandthepalestinians
63. https://www.iire.org/node/775
64. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian_Authority
65. https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/03/25/rain-fire/israels-unlawful-use-white-phosphorus-gaza
66. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mustafa_Barghouti
67. https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/steadfast-goliath
68. https://www.democracynow.org/2014/7/30/henry_siegman_leading_voice_of_us
69. https://newint.org/features/special/2009/01/21/israels-eternal-impunity
70. https://electronicintifada.net/content/how-israel-was-absolved-deir-yassin-and-all-other-massacres/14416
71. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4369335,00.html
72. https://www.commentary.org/jason-maoz-2/what-did-moshe-yaalon-really-say/